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THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROADWAY AIR 
RIGHTS: BOSTON’S FUTURE,  
A SLAVE TO ITS PAST 
Andrew Schulte*
Abstract: The City of Boston and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
have attempted to develop air rights over the Boston Extension of the 
Massachusetts Turnpike ever since its construction during the 1960s. 
There is widespread agreement among politicians, developers and resi-
dents that such development would solve myriad existing problems— 
from aesthetics to safety, to a dire shortage of groundwater. Neverthe-
less, very little has been built and the turnpike remains an open scar, di-
viding the urban landscape and undermining important civic objectives. 
This Note attempts to explain the historical and legal obstacles that 
have prevented the development of air rights: namely, a misunderstand-
ing of city planning, a weak and belated home rule amendment, and 
the lingering effects of an Irish-Yankee rivalry. 
Introduction 
 The Boston extension of the Massachusetts Turnpike was built in 
the 1960s, shortly after the completion of the turnpike proper, to pro-
vide access to downtown Boston and revitalize a depressed economy.1 
To that end, the turnpike has more than served its purpose.2 By the 
1990s, the average income levels and employment rates in Boston, 
which were lagging in the 1960s, far exceeded the national norms.3 
Throughout Boston neighborhoods, vibrant streets and busy shops re-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------                                                   
*Solicitations Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2008–
09. 
1 Yanni K. Tsipis, Building the Mass Pike 9–10, 47–48 (2002). The legal definition 
of the “Boston extension” is “that portion of interstate highway route 90 beginning at and 
including the interchange of interstate highway route 90 and state highway route 128 in 
the town of Weston and ending in the city of Boston at the interchange of interstate high-
way route 90 and interstate highway route 93 . . . .” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 81A, § 3 (2005). 
The term “turnpike proper” is used to refer to interstate highway route 90 beginning at 
the Massachusetts/New York border and extending easterly to route 128 in Weston. See 
Tsipis, supra, at 47. This stretch of highway was built before the Boston extension due to 
financial considerations. See id. 
2 Boston Redev. Auth., A Civic Vision for Turnpike Air Rights in Boston 4 
(2000) [hereinafter Civic Vision]. 
3 Id. 
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placed empty store fronts.4 The price of convenience and economic 
growth, however, has been steep.5 A filthy, noisy, and wide swath of in-
terstate highway snakes through the center of once interconnected and 
pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods.6 In addition, the turnpike has ac-
celerated the depletion of groundwater to the point that wood pilings 
beneath buildings in the surrounding neighborhoods are rotting away.7
 From the beginning, policy makers in Massachusetts have been 
well aware of the proper remedy to the turnpike’s unwanted aftermath: 
the development of air rights.8 When turnpike construction forced the 
demolition of a Star Market in Newtonville, the Massachusetts Turn-
pike Authority (MTA) allowed the supermarket to rebuild over the 
highway.9 Additionally, the Prudential Insurance Company undertook a 
massive air rights development that coincided with the construction of 
the Boston extension as it cut through the Back Bay in the 1960s.10 
Other than these early examples, legislative hurdles and political rival-
ries have consistently thwarted the development of air rights, leaving 
Boston’s ugly scar largely open and untreated for nearly fifty years.11
-----------------------------------------------------------------------                                                   
4 Id. at 4. 
5 Id. at 1 (describing the turnpike as a “physical, social and economic breach”); see 
Thomas C. Palmer, Jr., Building on the Pike, Boston Globe, Mar. 19, 2006, at E1 (discussing 
the neighborhood divide created by the turnpike). 
6 Civic Vision, supra note 2, at 1, 3, 4; Susannah Patton, Seeking a Clear Vision for Air 
Rights, Boston Herald, Feb. 14, 2000, at 23 (“It’s an asphalt gash through the heart of 
Boston, spreading a trail of fumes and noise from Back Bay to Brighton.”). 
7 Thomas C. Palmer, Jr., Columbus Center Will Make an Impact on Boston’s Skyline. And 
Under Ground, Boston Globe, Feb. 21, 2005, at D1. Currently, rainwater falls on the turn-
pike and is swept into the harbor unused—a major problem because buildings in the Back 
Bay and the South End are built on wood pilings that require moisture to retain their 
strength. Id. A ground level deck, however, will catch the rainfall and allow it to soak into 
the earth, helping to avert an engineering nightmare and billions of dollars in damage. See 
id. 
8 See Civic Vision, supra note 2, at 13 (“Efforts to deck over the Turnpike began al-
most as soon as the extension was completed.”); Palmer, supra note 5, at E1 (quoting Alex 
Krieger, an urban planner and chief executive of Chan Krieger & Associates: “Since ’62, 
we’ve assumed there would be a substantial covering [of the turnpike]”). Air rights have 
been defined as “the right to occupy the space above a specified plane over, on, or beneath 
a designated tract of land.” Comment, Conveyance and Taxation of Air Rights, 64 Colum. L. 
Rev. 338, 338 (1964). 
9 Tsipis, supra note 1, at 14; see also Lease of Premises in Newtonville, Massachusetts, 
Between Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and Star Properties of Newton, Inc. ( July 1, 
1963). 
10 Tsipis, supra note 1, at 47–48, 88–89. 
11 See infra Part III. Copley Place, completed in 1984, involved the use of air rights but 
also included a large parcel of terra firma owned by the MTA. Interview with Paul 
McCann, Executive Assistant to Director, Boston Redevelopment Authority, in Boston, 
Mass. (Dec. 12, 2007). The twenty-three parcels designated for development by the MTA in 
the early 1990s—made up almost exclusively of air rights—have proved much more diffi-
cult to develop. See Palmer, supra note 5, at E5; McCann, supra. 
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 The hurdles and rivalries that hinder air rights development also 
have an insidious effect on Boston’s growth in general.12 Therefore, 
although this Note focuses on the development of air rights over the 
Boston Extension of the Massachusetts Turnpike, there is more at 
stake than this stretch of interstate highway.13 This Note explains how 
a historical misunderstanding of the principles of planning, a weak 
and belated home rule amendment, and an Irish-Yankee rivalry have 
restricted the City of Boston’s ability to control its own growth and 
have hindered the much-needed development of air rights. 
 Part I of this Note describes the historical context of Massachu-
setts’ planning and home rule legislation. This historical context ex-
plains why Massachusetts legislation operates as it does and how it 
could have been different. Part II describes the City of Boston’s histori-
cal development and Irish heritage and the significant role these fac-
tors have played in the state legislature’s unique treatment of the city 
with regard to land use law. Part III explains how the historical factors 
introduced in Parts I and II affect the current development of air rights 
over the Massachusetts Turnpike, using WinnDevelopment’s high pro-
file “Columbus Center” project as a case study. Part IV suggests that the 
Massachusetts state legislature must break away from past misunder-
standings and biases in order to allow for the responsible and efficient 
development of turnpike air rights and the city as a whole. 
I. Municipalities in Massachusetts: Planless and Powerless 
A. Lack of Planning 
 Today’s land use laws are commonly understood as a binary system 
of two separate powers: planning and zoning.14 Planning sets forth 
long-term growth objectives according to the particular needs of a mu-
nicipality, such as transportation, affordable housing, and infrastruc-
ture.15 Zoning implements these objectives by specifying where differ-
ent structures and uses may be built.16 In their finest form, planning 
and zoning create a comprehensive and proactive system that prevents 
disputes before they arise and provides for necessities such as parks, 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------                                                   
12 See infra, Part II (discussing Boston’s unique land use laws and the city’s resulting 
lack of control over its own development). 
13 See infra, Part II. 
14 See Daniel R. Mandelker et al., Planning and Control of Land Development: 
Cases and Materials 25–27 (6th ed. 2005). 
15 Id. at 26–28. 
16 Id. at 209. 
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schools, and affordable housing before they become deficiencies.17 
Some states have come closer to this ideal than others, and Massachu-
setts is one of the latter.18
 Massachusetts’s land use laws are lacking because planning—one 
half of the land use law binary system—has been misunderstood and 
underappreciated for generations.19 To comprehend the deficiency of 
planning in Massachusetts, one must study the evolution of land use 
law from the beginning.20
1. The National Planning and Zoning Movement 
 Land use law evolved from nuisance law, which is neither compre-
hensive nor proactive, but piecemeal and reactive.21 During the nine-
teenth century, the inefficiency of nuisance law led many communities 
to adopt fire and health regulations, such as prohibiting noxious indus-
tries from locating in residential areas or limiting the height of wooden 
buildings.22 These regulations were more comprehensive than nui-
sance law, but they only applied to certain industries or particular types 
of construction.23 In general, private property rights remained su-
preme and were only restricted in the most extreme cases.24
 Eventually, the concept of zoning took root in New York City 
when the city’s Board of Estimate and Apportionment promulgated 
the first city-wide zoning regulation in 1916.25 Unlike previous laws, 
the New York zoning regulations applied to all landowners regardless 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------                                                   
17 See Am. Planning Ass’n, Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook 7-6 to -7 (Stuart 
Meck ed., 2002) (listing the advantages of local planning) [hereinafter Growing Smart]; 
cf. Joel S. Russell, Massachusetts Land-Use Laws—Time for a Change, Land Use Law & Zon-
ing Dig., Jan. 2002, at 3, 6 (explaining the inefficiency of zoning without planning). 
18 Russell, supra note 17, at 3. 
19 See infra Part I.A.2. 
20 See Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 26 (describing the current influence of 
model acts passed in the 1920s). 
21 See 1 Michael S. Giaimo, Massachusetts Zoning Manual § 1.2 (Martin R. Healy 
ed., 4th ed. 2007); Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 52–58. Nuisance claims, like all 
torts, require past or ongoing conduct by the defendant and substantial harm to the plain-
tiff, thereby restricting the use of nuisance law to individual cases in the past or present. 1 
Giaimo, supra, § 1.2; Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 52. 
22 1 Giaimo, supra note 21, § 1.2; see, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 414 
(1915) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting brick manufacturing in a residential area); 
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107–08 (1909) (upholding height restrictions in a residential 
area of Boston). 
23 1 Giaimo, supra note 21, § 1.2; see Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 410; Welch, 214 U.S. at 107–
08. 
24 1 Giaimo, supra note 21, § 1.2. 
25 Id. § 1.2.1; Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 209. 
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of their business or construction methods.26 Under the New York 
model, the entire city was divided into residential, commercial, and 
unrestricted zones, with each progressive zone allowing for more uses 
and less restrictive structural regulations.27
 The validity of zoning regulations, such as the one promulgated in 
New York City, was challenged in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.28 
The plaintiff claimed that the zoning ordinance was an unconstitu-
tional deprivation of his liberty and property in violation of equal pro-
tection and the due process of law.29 In a pivotal decision, the Supreme 
Court held that zoning is a means of protecting the health, safety, and 
welfare of the public and is therefore a valid exercise of police power.30 
In coming to his conclusion, Justice George Sutherland drew from the 
common law nuisance theory, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (“use 
your property so as not to damage another’s”).31 Therefore, so long as 
zoning is rationally related to preventing harm, it falls under constitu-
tional police powers.32
 Meanwhile, Herbert Hoover, the Secretary of Commerce under 
Warren G. Harding, was gaining an appreciation for zoning as a tool 
to improve the quality of life and promote commerce throughout 
America.33 To encourage and control widespread zoning initiatives, 
Hoover formed the Advisory Committee on City Planning and Zoning 
(ACCPZ) in 1921 in order to draft a Standard Zoning Enabling Act 
(SZEA) and a Standard City Planning Enabling Act (SCPEA).34
 The SZEA and SCPEA encouraged and aided states nationwide to 
adopt progressive land use laws.35 Tragically, the ACCPZ failed to con-
vey the importance of planning and establish it as a prerequisite to zon-
ing.36 Their failure was both substantive and procedural.37 In sub-
stance, the SZEA states that zoning “shall be made in accordance with a 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------                                                   
26 1 Giaimo, supra note 21, § 1.2.1; Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 209. 
27 Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 209. 
28 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926). 
29 Id. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states in part, 
“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
30 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389–90. 
31 Id. at 387–88; Black’s Law Dictionary 1757 (8th ed. 2004). 
32 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389–91. 
33 Ruth Knack et al., The Real Story Behind the Standard Planning and Zoning Acts of the 
1920s, Land Use Law, Feb. 1996, at 3, 3. 
34 Id. at 3–6. 
35 See id. at 8. 
36 See Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 26; Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a 
Comprehensive Plan, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154, 1157 (1955). 
37 See Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 26; Haar, supra note 36, at 1157. 
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comprehensive plan,” but fails to define what a “comprehensive plan” 
entails.38 Even the SCPEA contains contradictory statements and con-
fusing explanations of how the plan should relate to zoning.39 Proce-
durally, the ACCPZ published the SZEA two years before the SCPEA, 
thereby facilitating zoning without planning.40
2. Planning and Zoning in Massachusetts 
 Massachusetts is one of the states that fell through the crack cre-
ated by the ACCPZ’s failure to properly associate planning and zon-
ing.41 The General Court of Massachusetts adopted the Common-
wealth’s original zoning enabling act in 1920 and recodified it in 1933 
after the release of the SZEA.42 The planning enabling act, however, 
was not passed until 1947, thus giving zoning in Massachusetts a twenty-
seven year head start on planning.43
 On its face, the planning enabling act, found in chapter 41, sec-
tion 81D of the Massachusetts General Laws, appears to require local 
planning.44 In reality, the requirement has no teeth because the statute 
does not give the government any enforcement powers.45 Moreover, 
comprehensive plans adopted by local governments are next to mean-
ingless because the statute does not require zoning to be in accordance 
with the plan.46 This is not the case in states such as California, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Delaware, Florida, and others where a comprehensive 
plan is required before zoning can take place and continued compli-
ance with the plan is mandatory.47
 The purpose of a prerequisite, mandatory plan is to prevent hap-
hazard zoning that forfeits long-term goals.48 Unfortunately, the empty 
planning legislation in Massachusetts allows for unpredictable zoning 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------                                                   
38 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 3 (1926); 
Haar, supra note 36, at 1157. 
39 T.J. Kent, Jr., The Urban General Plan 35, 38 (1990); see U.S. Dept. of Com-
merce, A Standard City Planning Enabling Act § 6 (1928). 
40 Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 26. 
41 See Russell, supra note 17, at 3–4. 
42 1 Giaimo, supra note 21, § 1.3.2 to .3; see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40, § 25 (1933) (cur-
rent version at Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A (2004)). 
43 See ch. 40A, § 4; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, § 81D (2004). 
44 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, §§ 81A, 81D (2004); Russell, supra note 17, at 4. 
45 Russell, supra note 17, at 4; see ch. 41, §§ 81A, 81D. 
46 Russell, supra note 17, at 4; see ch. 41, § 81D (mandating only that the plan shall be 
internally consistent). 
47 Growing Smart, supra note 17, at 7-65; Russell, supra note 17, at 4 n.2. 
48 See Haar, supra note 36, at 1157–58. 
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decisions that create complex legal battles between municipalities and 
developers.49
B. Weak Home Rule 
 The authority of municipalities to plan and zone is derived from 
the police power, which enables governments to pass legislation that 
provides for the “public health, safety, morals, and welfare.”50 Some 
states follow “Dillon’s Rule,” under which police power resides exclu-
sively with the state and may only flow to the municipalities through 
specific delegation.51 In other states— “home rule” states—police power 
over local matters resides with the municipalities and is only limited by 
specific exemptions or preemptions enacted by the state.52 Although 
Massachusetts is technically a home rule state, Boston’s power over local 
affairs is significantly constricted due to a host of exemptions and pre-
emptions.53
1. The National Home Rule Movement 
 Before the home rule movement, federal and state constitutions 
gave no rights to local governments.54 The state specifically defined 
and delegated every instance of local power.55 Moreover, most state 
courts subscribed to Dillon’s Rule which stated that, when in question, 
grants of power should be narrowly construed.56
 Today, however, the home rule system has replaced Dillon’s Rule 
in the majority of states.57 The home rule revolution came in two 
waves.58 The first occurred at the end of the nineteenth century and 
was more robust—treating cities as independent states within states.59 
Under this model, cities and towns possess unrestricted power over 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------                                                   
49 See Russell, supra note 17, at 6. 
50 1 Healy et al., Massachusetts Zoning Manual § 2.2.1 (Martin R. Healy ed., 4th 
ed. 2007); see Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, art. IV. 
51 1 Healy et al., supra note 50, § 2.2.1; Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 211–12. 
52 1 Healy et al., supra note 50, § 2.2.1; Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 211–12. 
53 See infra Part I.B.2. 
54 1 Healy et al., supra note 50, § 2.2.1; Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 211–12. 
55 1 Healy et al., supra note 50, § 2.2.1; Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 211–12; 
see Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 271, 281 (1816) (establishing that, in Massachusetts, “the 
powers of towns, as well as parishes, are either entirely derived from some legislative act, or 
defined and limited by the general statutes prescribing the powers and duties of both 
classes of corporations”). 
56 Mandelker et al., supra note 14, at 212. 
57 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10–11 (1990). 
58 Id. at 10. 
59 Id. 
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municipal affairs.60 The second—and more restrained—wave of the 
home rule revolution followed World War II.61 Although municipalities 
still had general police powers over local issues, they could be limited 
by specific state exemptions.62 Defined restrictions helped the courts 
determine what qualifies as “municipal affairs” and what issues are out-
side the power of local governments.63
2. Home Rule in Massachusetts 
 Massachusetts finally adopted a restrained home rule amendment 
in 1966.64 Article 89 of the Massachusetts State Constitution, better 
known as the Home Rule Amendment, empowers municipalities to 
adopt their own charters, act independently of state-delegated power, 
and petition the General Court for special legislation.65 However, the 
amendment also contains significant limits on these powers.66
 Most of the municipalities in the Greater Boston area, including 
Boston itself, have declined their power to adopt their own charters.67 
This is due to the confusing and rigid procedure for adopting charters 
that is set forth in the Home Rule Amendment.68 Moreover, by the time 
the amendment was adopted in 1966, cities in Massachusetts had de-
veloped for so long without a home rule charter that adopting one 
would be immensely complicated.69 It is easier for Boston and other 
cities in Massachusetts to petition the General Court for specific 
changes to the charter rather than adopt an entirely new one.70 There-
fore, one of the most central characteristics of home rule power has 
gone largely unused in Massachusetts.71
 Similar to the charter provision, the general powers granted by the 
Home Rule Amendment are not quite what they seem.72 Standing 




63 See Briffault, supra note 57, at 10. 
64 David J. Barron et al., Dispelling the Myth of Home Rule: Local Power in 
Greater Boston 1 (2004); Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, Boston Bound: A Com-
parison of Boston’s Legal Powers with Those of Six Other Major American Cities 
17 (2007); see Mass. Const. amend. art. LXXXIX. 
65 Mass. Const. amend. art. LXXXIX; see Barron et al., supra note 64, at 1. 
66 Frug & Barron, supra note 64, at 17. 
67 Barron et al., supra note 64, at 3–4; Frug & Barron, supra note 64, at 18. 
68 Barron et al., supra note 64, at 4–5; Frug & Barron, supra note 64, at 18; see Mass. 
Const. amend. art. LXXXIX, §§ 2–4. 
69 Frug & Barron, supra note 64, at 17, 18. 
70 Barron et al., supra note 64, at 5–6; Frug & Barron, supra note 64, at 18. 
71 Barron et al., supra note 64, at 4; Frug & Barron, supra note 64, at 18. 
72 Frug & Barron, supra note 64, at 19. 
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alone, the declaration that “[a]ny city or town may . . . exercise any 
power or function which the general court has power to confer upon 
it” appears expansive.73 However, large areas of this power have been 
carved out through exceptions and preemption.74 Massachusetts Con-
stitutional Amendment, article 89, section 7 lists six areas in which mu-
nicipalities have no power to act: regulating elections, levying taxes, 
borrowing money, disposing of park land, enacting private or civil law 
governing civil relationships, and punishing felonies.75 These exemp-
tions are very limiting compared to those found in other home rule 
states.76
 While the ban on taxing and borrowing may have the most direct 
effect on local initiatives, the private and civil affairs exception has 
been defined expansively.77 For example, in Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent 
Review & Grievance Board, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts struck down a rent control statute in Boston because it interfered 
with the “civil relationship” between landlords and tenants.78
 In addition to expanding written exemptions, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court inferred an additional “intermunicipal” exception in Beard 
v. Town of Salisbury.79 In that case, the court placed the burden on the 
town, stating, “nothing in . . . the Home Rule Amendment can be 
construed to allow a municipality . . . to regulate or prohibit intermu-
nicipal traffic.”80 According to the Home Rule Amendment, however, 
the burden should be on the State to prove the amendment specifi-
cally disallows the action.81
 Specific exemptions are just one layer of limitation on the Home 
Rule Amendment; the other is the amorphous preemption clause.82 
Several actions that are not enumerated as exempt are nonetheless out-
side the power of cities and towns because they are “inconsistent with 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------                                                   
73 Mass. Const. amend. art. LXXXIX, § 6. 
74 Id. §§ 6–7. 
75 Id. § 7. 
76 Frug & Barron, supra note 64, at 20–21 (comparing home rule in Massachusetts to 
home rule in Colorado, Illinois, California, New York, Washington, and Georgia); see also 
David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2255, 2263 (2003) (contending 
that no home rule amendment establishes actual local legal autonomy). 
77 See Frug & Barron, supra note 64, at 20. 
78 260 N.E.2d 200, 205 (Mass. 1970) (stating “[t]he term ‘private or civil law governing 
civil relationships’ is broad enough to include law controlling ordinary and usual relation-
ships between landlords and tenants [and] is not so confined as clearly to apply only to 
general legislation”). 
79 392 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Mass. 1979). 
80 Id. 
81 See Mass. Const. amend. art. LXXXIX, §§ 1, 6 (stating that the power of cities and 
towns shall only be denied by express or clearly implicated limitations). 
82 Id. §§ 6–7. 
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the constitution or laws enacted by the general court.”83 The phrase “in-
consistent with” allows courts ample discretion when determining which 
local ordinances to uphold and which to strike down as ultra vires.84 In 
Bloom v. City of Worcester, the Supreme Judicial Court applied an expan-
sive interpretation of the phrase, stating “[l]egislation which deals with a 
subject comprehensively, describing (perhaps among other things) what 
municipalities can and cannot do, may reasonably be inferred as in-
tended to preclude the exercise of any local power or function on the 
same subject because otherwise the legislative purpose of that statute 
would be frustrated.”85 Since state legislation deals with a multitude of 
subjects, the limits to local power are numerous and ever-growing.86
II. Boston Takes the Brunt 
 Boston’s lack of local power is exaggerated by its role as the state’s 
largest and most densely populated city, as well as a prolonged political 
rivalry between the Yankees and the Irish.87 Boston’s position as the 
most populated city in the Commonwealth creates concerns not pre-
sent in smaller cities and attracts increased attention from the General 
Court.88 Moreover, the historical feud between Boston’s Irish politi-
cians and the Commonwealth’s English-bred politicians led to addi-
tional limitations on Boston’s autonomy.89 Nowhere are these unique 
concerns and limitations more apparent than in the city’s land use 
laws.90
-----------------------------------------------------------------------                                                   
83 Id. § 6. 
84 See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 633 (Mass. 1978) (finding that 
state law regulating election financing barred the City of Boston from spending money on 
an election information campaign); Bloom v. City of Worcester, 293 N.E.2d 268, 280 (Mass. 
1973). 
85 293 N.E.2d at 280. 
86 Frug & Barron, supra note 64, at 22. 
87 See Frug & Barron, supra note 64, at 11–17 (describing the long history of state in-
tervention into Boston’s affairs and the reasons for it); David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, 
Defensive Localism: A View of the Field from the Field, 21 J.L. & Pol. 261, 267 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Defensive Localism] (arguing that large cities have a unique need for local autonomy). 
88 See David R. Berman, Local Government and the States 55 (2003); Defensive Lo-
calism, supra note 87, at 267. 
89 Frug & Barron, supra note 64, at 14. 
90 See 1960 Mass. Acts 562 (creating a special redevelopment authority for the city of 
Boston); 1956 Mass. Acts 610–17 (setting forth Boston’s unique zoning laws). 
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A. Boston’s Unique Characteristics 
1. The Flagship City 
 By their nature, large cities face different issues and more compli-
cated problems than do suburban and rural municipalities.91 Densely 
populated cities must address traffic, sanitation, and safety concerns 
not present in the suburbs.92 Moreover, cities are a “complex micro-
cosm of the state or nation” in that they include significant economic, 
residential, and cultural components and are home to the full spec-
trum of class and race.93 Smaller towns and suburbs, on the other 
hand, are often homogeneous and primarily residential.94
 In the campaign for greater autonomy, the city’s “microcosm” des-
ignation can be a blessing or a curse.95 Although home rule is more 
practical in large and diverse settings, flagship cities demand more at-
tention from state governments because their fate affects the welfare of 
the entire state.96 Boston’s designation as a “microcosm” has not led to 
the autonomy enjoyed by several other large cities.97 Indeed, Boston’s 
unique, big-city issues have led to more state interference, not less.98
2. Curse of the Irish 
 Cultural differences between the residents of a flagship city and 
the state as a whole often generate distrust between the state and city 
governments, which leads to increased attention and undue interfer-
ence.99 This was certainly the case in Boston, where tens of thousands 
of Irish immigrants disrupted the traditionally English-bred city dur-
ing the potato famine of the 1840s.100 Not only did the Irish arrive in 
overwhelming numbers, they arrived poor, sick, and for the most part 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------                                                   
91 Defensive Localism, supra note 87, at 267. 
92 See Berman, supra note 88, at 55. 
93 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 
346, 347 (1990). 
94 Id. 
95 See Berman, supra note 88, at 55; Briffault, supra note 93, at 347. 
96 See Berman, supra note 88, at 55; Briffault, supra note 93, at 347. 
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uneducated.101 The strain on the economy was undeniable, with large 
numbers of “aged, blind, paralytic, and lunatic immigrants” becoming 
“charges on [Boston’s] public charities.”102 As a result, tax rates in-
creased and property values dwindled.103
 The cultural impact was even more disturbing than the economic 
impact for many Protestant, native-born “Yankees.”104 Poverty and lack 
of education spawned alcoholism, crime, and violence within the Irish 
community.105 The Yankee establishment viewed the Irish as “idle, 
thriftless, poor, intemperate, and barbarian.”106 In addition to the cul-
tural divide, the Yankees and Irish had different views of religion, slav-
ery, immigration, and political management.107 All of these factors led 
to mutual distrust and political antagonism.108
 Over time the condition of the Boston Irish improved.109 When 
Irish-born Hugh O’Brien won the mayoral election of 1884, it marked 
their triumphant ascendance from listless immigrants to powerful po-
litical leaders.110 As the Irish took control of City Hall, the Yankees 
reinforced their power from the State House.111 From their position 
in the State House—and without the restrictions of home rule—the 
Yankees were able to amend Boston’s charter and retool the structure 
of its government without any input from the Irish.112 From 1885 to 
1909, the State reduced the power of the city council, abolished the 
board of aldermen, and established commissions to oversee city ac-
counts, budgets, and mayoral appointees.113
 The State did not always interfere with Boston’s local government 
unilaterally.114 During the financial crisis of the 1950s and 1960s, Bos-
ton voluntarily handed over control to the State to relieve itself of 
costs and acquire badly needed funding.115 For example, in 1956, Bos-
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ton’s Irish-American mayor, John B. Hynes ceded control of the city’s 
ports, the Tobin Bridge, and Logan Airport to the newly created state 
agency, the Massachusetts Port Authority.116 Additionally, Boston glad-
ly allowed the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority—a state entity—to 
assume the responsibility and costs of building the Boston extension 
of the turnpike during the 1960s.117
 The passage of the Home Rule Amendment in 1966 finally re-
strained the State’s ability to interfere with Boston’s local government 
by prohibiting the General Court from passing city-specific laws.118 The 
amendment, however, failed to make the prohibition retroactive.119 
Therefore, fallout from the Yankee-Irish rivalry and the post-World War 
II financial crisis continues to play a central role in Boston politics.120
B. Boston’s Unique Land Use Laws 
 One of the most prominent examples of Boston’s special treat-
ment is the fact that the city has its own zoning enabling act and a spe-
cially tailored planning and redevelopment authority, with different 
provisions than those governing the rest of the state.121
 Boston’s zoning enabling act, set forth in chapter 665 of the 1956 
Massachusetts Acts, differs from chapter 40A of the Massachusetts Gen-
eral Laws in many significant respects.122 Chief among these differences 
is the distribution of power.123 Whereas the power to pass zoning ordi-
nances is granted to the democratically elected city councilors under 
chapter 40A, Boston has a separate Zoning Commission.124 Moreover, 
members of the Zoning Commission are not elected; instead, five 
members are nominated by interest groups that represent architects, 
builders, labor unions, and residential neighborhoods and six are ap-
pointed by the mayor according to special criteria.125
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 Much like its zoning enabling act, Boston’s redevelopment author-
ity is the result of special legislation.126 The Boston Redevelopment Au-
thority (BRA) is a semi-public corporation charged with drafting a 
comprehensive plan, encouraging economic growth, and making rec-
ommendations to the Zoning Commission.127 Other redevelopment 
authorities in Massachusetts are under the control of the City Commis-
sion, but BRA board members are appointed by the mayor (four ap-
pointees) and the governor (one appointee).128 Additionally, every 
other municipality in Massachusetts has a planning board and a rede-
velopment authority, thereby separating the two functions.129 In Bos-
ton, both powers are held by the BRA.130 The unique concentration of 
power held by the BRA has been highly controversial.131 Opponents 
argue that an entity charged with economic development and planning 
has an unavoidable conflict of interest because they are responsible for 
both long-term goal setting and short-term economic return.132
 The BRA is similar to other redevelopment authorities through-
out the Commonwealth in one significant respect: adherence to the 
comprehensive plan is not mandatory.133 As explained in Part I, the 
Massachusetts General Laws do not mandate adherence to compre-
hensive plans and, for the purpose of interpreting the BRA’s planning 
powers, chapter 652, section 12 of the 1960 Massachusetts Acts states 
that the BRA is subject to Massachusetts General Laws.134
 The relatively small role played by the city’s elected officials and 
the conflicting goals of the BRA illustrate Massachusetts’ misunder-
standing and under-appreciation of planning.135 The Standard City 
Planning Enabling Act encourages the adoption of an independent 
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planning commission for good reason—to avoid the “pressures of 
purely current problems.”136 In Boston, this mandate has been lost.137
III. History’s Effect on the Development of Air Rights 
 The lack of appreciation for planning, the belated and weak 
Home Rule Amendment, and the state versus city rivalry have all played 
a part in the struggle to get air rights projects off the ground.138 All of 
these factors converged in the passing of the Massachusetts Turnpike 
Authority’s (MTA) zoning exemption for the development of air rights 
over the Boston extension of the turnpike.139
 Chapter 81A, section 15 of the Massachusetts General Laws sub-
jects the use of air rights over the turnpike to the state building code 
and to “such other requirements as the [MTA] deems necessary or ad-
visable to promote the public health, convenience, and safety of per-
sons and property.”140 The section, however, exempts the development 
of air rights from “any other building, fire, garage, health or zoning law 
or any building, fire, garage, health or zoning ordinance, rule or regu-
lation applicable in the city of Boston.”141 This exemption is limited, 
however, because the development of air rights requires terra firma 
upon which to dig footings, attach the deck, and connect utilities.142 
Unlike air rights, terra firma must comport with Boston’s zoning code 
according to chapter 81A, section 16 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws.143 With the BRA in control of the terra firma on either side of 
the turnpike, and the MTA holding on to its zoning exemption, a 
thirty-four year standoff ensued, during which little was built.144
 Eventually, the Central Artery/Tunnel Project (CA/T project), 
better known as the Big Dig, forced the two sides to the negotiation ta-
ble.145 With the cost of the CA/T project escalating by the billons, in-
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come from the development of air rights became increasingly neces-
sary.146 To this end, the MTA and the BRA broke their stalemate and 
drafted several mechanisms to bridge the void created by the zoning 
exemption.147 These mechanisms, while providing guidelines similar to 
those found in a zoning ordinance, are marred by the very shortcom-
ings that created the exemption in the first place: unenforceable com-
prehensive plans, weak home rule, and the legacy of the Irish-Yankee 
feud.148
A. The Effects of Weak Planning Legislation on Air Rights Development 
 The 1963 enactment of the air rights zoning exemption illustrated 
the Commonwealth’s lack of appreciation for comprehensive local 
planning.149 Air rights parcels in Boston comprise forty-four acres of 
potential real estate valued at more than $500 million.150 With no con-
trol over such a large and crucial swath of land, the BRA’s ability to carry 
out its duty as the city’s planning board has been severely limited.151
 Even after the CA/T project led to a compromise, the effects of 
Massachusetts’ weak planning legislation persisted.152 The document 
that purports to be a comprehensive plan for air rights development— 
A Civic Vision for Turnpike Air Rights in Boston (Civic Vision)—is limited by 
chapter 41, section 81D of the Massachusetts General Laws, which fails 
to make adherence to comprehensive plans mandatory.153 Indeed, the 
first successful air rights development proposal since the compromise 
strays significantly from the Civic Vision, setting a dangerous, yet all-too-
familiar precedent.154
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1. Origins of the Civic Vision 
 As the CA/T project got underway in 1993, the MTA issued the Air 
Rights Study in order to inform public discussion about “[w]hat kind of 
development should be encouraged, how much development could be 
accommodated, and where along the corridor should development be 
located[.]”155 With the BRA maintaining control over the terra firma, 
the MTA’s study was merely exploratory.156 Nevertheless, the issues, op-
portunities, and development scenarios it introduced facilitated discus-
sion about the future development of air rights.157
 In 1997, with the cost of the CA/T project mounting, the state leg-
islature instructed the MTA and the BRA to sign a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) regarding the development of air rights over 
the turnpike.158 The MOU is based on article 80 of the Boston Zoning 
Code—an article that empowers the BRA to make a scoping review and 
adequacy determination of all development projects in Boston that re-
sult in the addition of at least 20,000 square feet.159 For the most part, 
the MOU mirrors the procedure set forth in article 80, section B-5, with 
the notable additions of MTA oversight and an arbitration clause.160
 In 1988 Boston Mayor Thomas M. Menino created a Strategic De-
velopment Study Committee (SDSC) to set standards of review for 
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MOU projects.161 Through collaboration with city and state agencies, 
developers, and community members, the SDSC established general 
development objectives such as increasing public transportation, en-
riching the unique characteristics of surrounding neighborhoods, cre-
ating affordable housing and jobs, and improving the public realm.162 
Additionally, the SDSC applied these general objectives to the specific 
needs of each affected neighborhood.163 Together, the MOU and the 
Civic Vision provide guidelines that would normally be found in a zon-
ing ordinance.164
2. Limits of the Civic Vision 
 While the MOU is a binding legal document, the Civic Vision can-
not be enforced in and of itself.165 The lack of enforceability comports 
with Massachusetts’s standard approach to planning—as an activity that 
is encouraged, but is neither mandatory nor enforceable.166 The Civic 
Vision, like all other Massachusetts comprehensive plans, may be ig-
nored without consequence.167 Indeed, “Columbus Center” —the first 
air rights proposal to gain BRA approval since the 1997 MOU—varies 
significantly from the Civic Vision’s guidelines.168
 Columbus Center is a planned multiuse development spanning 
Boston’s Back Bay, South End, and Bay Village neighborhoods.169 The 
project, as proposed by WinnDevelopment, involves over one million 
square feet of livable space, including approximately 199 hotel rooms, 
493 residential units, a health club, a daycare, retail stores, and restau-
rants.170 If completed, the project will include thirty-five story, fourteen 
story, and seven story buildings on three adjacent air rights parcels.171
 The Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), New England’s largest 
nonprofit environmental advocate, noted the significant discrepancies 
between the Civic Vision and WinnDevelopment’s proposal in a memo-
randum of concern addressed to the BRA during the MOU-styled re-
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view process.172 CLF’s memorandum observes that—among other sub-
stantial deviations—the Columbus Center proposal involves taller 
buildings, significantly less green space, far more parking spaces, and 
less public access than called for by the Civic Vision.173 The BRA, how-
ever, chose to approve WinnDevelopment’s proposal despite these in-
consistencies.174 Unfortunately for the CLF and its clients, there is no 
legal recourse for enforcing the Civic Vision due to Massachusetts’s weak 
planning enabling statute.175
B. The Effects of Weak Home Rule on Air Rights Development 
 In powerful home rule states, the MTA’s influence over the BRA’s 
ability to guide development in Boston would be impermissible.176 
Amendments adopted pursuant to the first, more robust wave of the 
home rule revolution grant local governments unrestricted jurisdiction 
over all “municipal affairs.”177 Planning and zoning (along with public 
education) are two of the most fundamental and widely recognized 
municipal affairs.178 In Massachusetts, however, the State may explicitly 
or implicitly preempt any local power—including those as fundamental 
as planning and zoning.179 The MTA’s zoning exemption under chap-
ter 81A, section 15 of the Massachusetts General Laws is an example of 
explicit preemption under the Commonwealth’s Home Rule Amend-
ment.180
 The extent of the preemption and its relationship with the MOU 
is the subject of an ongoing controversy.181 While chapter 81A, section 
15 authorizes the MTA to lease air rights and exempts such leases from 
zoning, section 16 authorizes the MTA to lease land but expressly sub-
jects these leases to zoning.182 As explained above, the city’s ability to 
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control the terra firma was instrumental in preventing the develop-
ment of air rights before the 1997 MOU.183
 Ironically, the clear-cut division of control between air rights and 
terra firma—the very situation that made the MOU necessary—was 
distorted by language within the MOU.184 The MTA claims that the 
MOU acknowledges a statutory zoning exemption for both air rights 
and land.185 CLF and other groups claim that the provisions of chapter 
81A, section 16 prevail no matter what the MOU may suggest, and 
therefore, projects involving terra firma are subject to the article 80 
review process.186 Thus far, the issue has not been litigated.187 If the 
conflict does go to court, however, Massachusetts’s Home Rule 
Amendment could play a major role.188 The Home Rule Amendment 
prohibits any local law that is “inconsistent with the constitution or laws 
enacted by the general court.”189 The flexibility of the phrase “inconsis-
tent with” may be enough to prevent article 80 review over projects in-
volving both air rights and terra firma.190
C. The Effects of the Irish-Yankee Feud on Air Rights Development 
1. The Feud’s Influence on the Zoning Exemption 
 The MTA’s zoning exemption does not apply anywhere but the city 
of Boston—an anomaly that would violate the Home Rule Amendment 
if it were passed today.191 The exemption, however, was passed in 1963, 
three years before Massachusetts enacted the amendment, and there-
fore remains good law.192 Although Boston was in need of funding for a 
turnpike in the 1960s and welcomed state aid, the special zoning ex-
emption and continued state control of the Boston extension is an un-
wanted descendant of the old Irish-Yankee rivalry.193
 On the other hand, the State views the zoning exemption as fair 
consideration for construction of the Turnpike and security on their 
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2009] Development of Roadway Air Rights: The Boston Example 627 
investment.194 Subjecting plans to the BRA’s review process, however, 
does not nullify the economic benefits of air rights development.195 
Indeed, the MOU and the Civic Vision allow for city review and eco-
nomically beneficial development.196 Therefore, economic factors 
alone cannot explain the MTA’s zoning exemption and the ensuing 
thirty-four year standoff.197 This is because the exemption was more 
personal than financial; it was a product of the Irish-Yankee political 
saga.198
 Even with the signing of the MOU and the publication of the Civic 
Vision, the exemption still looms large.199 While Boston’s zoning code is 
vast and flexible, the MOU is narrow in scope and void of alterna-
tives.200 For example, under the Boston Zoning Code, the BRA/Zoning 
Commission may designate “special purpose overlay districts” with dis-
tinct regulations and review procedures.201 One such overlay district is 
called a “Planned Development Area” (PDA).202 PDAs can be estab-
lished for large projects through a contract signed by the BRA and the 
developer.203 The contract grants the BRA increased control over the 
developer’s project in return for streamlined approval.204
 The MOU does not provide for the flexibility of overlay districts.205 
Nevertheless, the BRA was able to circumvent the limits of the MOU by 
signing a PDA agreement with WinnDevelopment, which places Co-
lumbus Center in an overlay district with all the authority of a normal 
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zoning code.206 Due to the MTA’s zoning exception and according to 
the procedure set forth by the MOU, however, the plan signed by the 
BRA and WinnDevelopment is voluntary.207
 Although the agreement and resulting PDA is enforceable against 
WinnDevelopment due to its signature, it may not be enforceable if 
another developer were to take over the project.208 The voluntariness 
of the PDA may come into play because of Columbus Center’s current 
financial problems and the common practice of transferring develop-
ment rights from one proponent to another.209 If such a takeover were 
to occur with Columbus Center, the regulations set forth by the PDA 
could very well be null and void.210
2. Boston’s Peculiar Planning Board 
 Another instance of Irish-Yankee influenced legislation—the pe-
culiar organization of the BRA—also continues to effect the develop-
ment of air rights.211 As explained in Part II, every other municipality 
in Massachusetts has a planning board and a redevelopment authority, 
while in Boston, both powers are held by the BRA.212 According to 
many, this represents an irreconcilable conflict of interest.213 The con-
sequences of this conflict have been on display throughout Columbus 
Center’s highly publicized review process.214 In fact, CLF’s memoran-
dum of concern addressed to the BRA illustrates that the long-term 
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goals of the Civic Vision have already been sacrificed for the sake of 
economic growth.215
 CLF argued that the Civic Vision and the MOU should augment— 
not replace—article 80’s scoping determination and citizen review 
requirements.216 Additionally, CLF urged the Civic Vision to be utilized 
as a mandatory plan rather than a mere proposal.217 Neither of these 
demands was heard during the Columbus Center negotiations, and 
therefore, the project avoided several article 80 provisions and varies 
markedly from the plan outlined by the Civic Vision.218
 Moreover, CLF pointed to clear language in the Civic Vision stating 
that the goals therein should not be sacrificed for economic reasons 
alone: “[t]he SDSC believes inappropriate air rights development— 
projects that generate too much traffic or require buildings that dimin-
ish the character of their surroundings—should not be built. . . . These 
Guidelines should not be compromised in response to weak real estate 
conditions.”219 Despite this strong language, proponents for Columbus 
Center have indicated that variation from the Civic Vision was necessary 
for the sake of economic feasibility.220 It is hardly surprising that the 
BRA is willing to compromise a comprehensive plan for the sake of 
economic growth; after all, the BRA’s charter legislation charges it with 
responsibility for Boston’s economic vitality.221
IV. Meaningful Planning, No Exceptions: The Path  
to Responsible and Efficient Development  
of Air Rights 
 For reasons explained in Part III, the MOU and the Civic Vision 
are insufficient solutions to weak planning legislation and an unjusti-
fiable zoning exemption—they are mere stopgaps, hastily prepared 
and narrowly tailored to offset the costs of the CA/T project.222 Be-
neath this thin veneer lie impractical laws born of bias and outdated 
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legal philosophies.223 As long as comprehensive plans can be ignored 
without consequence and wholesale zoning exemptions remain on 
the books, the development of air rights (if not the city itself) will 
continue to be an arduous process with disappointing results.224
 Building a massive deck over six lanes of interstate highway and a 
commuter rail system is complicated and costly under any circum-
stances.225 Add the uncertainty of an unenforceable comprehensive 
plan plus a zoning exemption and the prospect of developing air 
rights becomes almost unthinkable.226 Developers require the pre-
dictability of zoning laws to draft their plans and attract investors.227 
When the plans involve an engineering-intensive deck that costs up-
wards of $160 million, predictability is all the more crucial.228 There-
fore, the uncertainty surrounding the Civic Vision and MOU is a major 
deterrent to the development of air rights.229
 Even if a developer survives the gauntlet of engineering, financing, 
governmental review, and public scrutiny, the Civic Vision and the MOU 
do not guarantee a satisfactory product.230 As discussed in Part III, the 
CLF memorandum cited a host of environmental, aesthetic, and cul-
tural shortcomings in the Columbus Center plans.231 Despite these 
shortcomings, Columbus Center has been fully approved.232 CLF’s 
memorandum to the BRA articulates the significance of such approval: 
Both because of the importance of the Columbus Center pro-
ject and because of the precedent that will be set for subse-
quent air rights proposals from Chinatown to Allston, it is es-
sential that the scoping documents issued by both the BRA 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------                                                   
223 See supra Part III. 
224 See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 5, at E5 (noting that the “[l]egal complexities alone 
were bewildering” for the proponents of Columbus Center); CLF Memorandum, supra 
note 151, at 4–6 (citing the many ways in which Columbus Center falls short of Civic Vi-
sion’s mandates). 
225 See Bailey, supra note 220, at D1 (citing the escalating costs of construction); Inter-
view with Arthur Winn, Chairman, WinnCompanies, in Boston, Mass. (Nov. 14, 2007); 
Scott Van Voorhis, Owners to be Liable for New Pike Tunnel, Boston Herald, July 12, 2007, at 
24 (illustrating the complications, such as ventilation and safety concerns, created by con-
structing a lengthy new tunnel over the turnpike). 
226 See Russell, supra note 17, at 4, 6; cf. Growing Smart, supra note 17, at 7-7 (explain-
ing the security afforded to developers in localities with reliable planning laws). 
227 See Growing Smart, supra note 17, at 7-7. 
228 See id.; Bailey, supra note 220, at D1. 
229 See Palmer, supra note 5, at E5 (quoting Matthew J. Kiefer, a director at the law firm 
Goulston & Storrs PC, who has worked on Columbus Center since 1997: “This is five-
dimensional chess for us”). 
230 See CLF Memorandum, supra note 151, at 4–6. 
231 Id. 
232 See BRA Memorandum, supra note 174, at 4–5. 
2009] Development of Roadway Air Rights: The Boston Example 631 
and Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) office 
clearly define the appropriate process and substance for review 
of Columbus Center and future air rights developments.233
There are still an additional nineteen air rights parcels designated for 
development by the MTA, and the precedent set by Columbus Center 
suggests air rights projects will continue to fall short of the Civic Vi-
sion’s guidelines.234
 To obtain a measure of predictability and facilitate truly responsi-
ble development, the Massachusetts General Court cannot hide out-
moded legislation with makeshift solutions—it must exorcize past de-
mons, revise the state’s planning enabling act, and repeal blanket zon-
ing exemptions.235 These changes will enable developers to create prac-
tical proposals that address the long-term needs set forth in the Civic 
Vision and empower the City of Boston to control its own future.236
A. Bucking the Past 
 As discussed in Parts II and III, the zoning exemption was created 
in 1963 due to a cultural rivalry, the absence of home rule, and the 
State’s desire for a return on its investment in the turnpike.237 When 
the Civic Vision was released in the summer of 2000, both the Gover-
nor of Massachusetts and the Mayor of Boston were Italian-Americans, 
the Commonwealth had been a home rule state for over thirty years, 
and very little money had been made from the development of turn-
pike air rights.238 Clearly, the environment into which the exemption 
was born has long since evaporated; and yet, this relic remains.239
 The United States has gone through several momentous social 
transformations since tens of thousands of Irish immigrants arrived 
on the shores of Boston during the 1840s, including the abolition of 
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slavery, the granting of women’s suffrage, and the Civil Rights Move-
ment. As cultural barriers throughout the nation have dissolved, so 
too has the divide between Irish-Catholics and Yankee-Protestants.240 
The Boston Irish have come a long way from the “idle, thriftless, poor, 
intemperate, and barbarian” immigrants they were characterized as in 
the nineteenth century.241 They are now, as one historian describes 
them, “statesmen and diplomats, physicians and lawyers, businessmen 
and bankers, artists and musicians, priests and poets.”242
 In addition to an enlightened society, Massachusetts has an evolved 
legal structure for local government.243 As discussed in Part I, munici-
pal control over local affairs has been widely accepted throughout the 
United States.244 In 1966, Massachusetts joined the home rule move-
ment by passing a constitutional amendment with the stated intent “to 
reaffirm the customary and traditional liberties of the people with re-
spect to the conduct of their local government, and to grant and con-
firm to the people of every city and town the right of self-government 
in local matters.”245 The state legislature, therefore, has recognized that 
laws such as the MTA’s zoning exemption—which only applies to Bos-
ton—go against the “customary and traditional liberties of the peo-
ple.”246 Nevertheless, the State continues to allow laws born of cultural 
biases and outmoded legal philosophies to dictate development in its 
largest city.247 It is time to break free of past mistakes and embrace an 
integrated and independent Boston. 
B. Meaningful Planning 
 Whereas home rule has been accepted in Massachusetts—if not 
always reflected in the law—mandatory and enforceable planning is 
essentially unheard of.248 Meanwhile, there is a growing consensus 
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among legal scholars, professional city planners, and politicians that 
effective planning is necessary for the proper enactment of zoning 
regulations.249 Unfortunately, reversing the early influences of the 
SZEA and the SCPEA, which led many states to enable zoning before 
planning, is a difficult task.250 After all, zoning is more flexible and 
immediately gratifying if it does not have to comport with a compre-
hensive plan.251 Immediate results are often attractive to city councilors 
who “must deal with a dynamic political environment and must engage 
in political bargaining.”252 Under this model, however, there is no ac-
counting for long-term goals such as affordable housing or environ-
mental sustainability.253
 In Massachusetts, where the zoning enabling act predates the 
planning enabling act by twenty-seven years, municipalities have grown 
accustomed to immediate gratification through flexible zoning poli-
cies.254 Sadly, these flexible policies are taking their toll on long-term 
goals and many communities are already paying the price.255 Columbus 
Center’s inconsistency with the Civic Vision is just one more example in 
a long pattern of sacrificing long-term needs for short-term benefits.256
 Oregon was the first state that enforced comprehensive local plans 
as mandatory and authoritative.257 Oregon’s landmark legislation, 
passed in 1973, “affords all Oregonians predictability and sustainability 
to the development process by allocating land for industrial, commer-
cial and housing development, as well as transportation and agricul-
ture.”258 Today, nearly half of the states throughout the country have 
followed Oregon’s lead and passed legislation that mandates local 
planning.259 In these states, comprehensive plans prevent zoning from 
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becoming arbitrary while maintaining the focus on long-term, complex 
objectives.260 As one expert puts it: 
We simply cannot satisfy all these conflicting demands on 
our physical resources at the same time without making 
tough and mutually exclusive choices. . . . It should be clear 
that the most reasonable way to moderate these conflicts is 
to sort them out before decisions have to be made about the 
use of land resources.261
In order to improve upon the arduous process of development and its 
oft-disappointing results, Massachusetts must join the growing contin-
gency of states that have recognized the vital importance of manda-
tory planning. 
C. No Exceptions 
 Mandating local planning and enforcing compliance would be a 
major step towards responsible development that addresses the com-
plex, long-term needs of municipalities in Massachusetts.262 Even if this 
step were taken, however, it would not apply to turnpike air rights in 
Boston as long as the MTA retains its zoning exemption.263 Therefore, 
in order to obtain desirable air-rights development, the zoning exemp-
tion cannot stand. 
 The exemption’s impracticality was painfully realized during the 
thirty-four year interim between its enactment and the signing of the 
MOU.264 Not only did the MTA face a need for city-controlled terra 
firma, it was up against a politically active community that demanded 
a voice in the development process.265 While the MOU appears to 
solve these problems, it does not establish zoning.266 The lack of zon-
ing creates uncertainty for developers and casts doubt on important 
agreements such as PDAs.267
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 Such uncertainty would be avoided if the State repealed MTA’s ex-
emption and established actual zoning.268 The Commonwealth has little 
to lose and much to gain by doing so.269 The power retained by the 
MTA through the MOU—the right of review and an arbitration clause—
are not worth the memorandum’s critical shortcomings.270 To wit, the 
MTA’s right of review depends on a showing of the BRA’s unreason-
ableness.271 Since the BRA has vast experience and wide discretion in 
issuing scoping determinations, a challenge from the MTA would al-
most certainly fail, barring egregious demands from the BRA.272 De-
mands on the developer are unlikely to reach the extent called for in 
the Civic Vision, let alone rise to the level of egregiousness.273
 Similar to the right of review, the arbitration clause is only exer-
cisable in the event that “the BRA has unreasonably withheld, condi-
tioned or delayed its certification.”274 Moreover, the proponent—not 
the MTA—holds the power to exercise the clause.275 Therefore, the 
clause provides deference to the BRA and is unlikely to be exercised 
by proponents who depend repeatedly on the BRA and are con-
cerned about creating goodwill.276 In fact, WinnDevelopment’s fa-
miliarity with the BRA and desire for goodwill surely played a role in 
its decision to sign a PDA, which further marginalized the MTA’s 
power.277 In the end, this largely nominal and marginalized power is 
not much to sacrifice for the sake of much-needed predictability.278
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Conclusion 
 There is little argument in Boston over whether or not the devel-
opment of air rights over the Massachusetts Turnpike is important. 
Such development attracts business, creates jobs, and increases the 
amenities and appeal of the city. In addition to these benefits, the de-
velopment of air rights solves myriad existing problems, including a 
dire shortage of groundwater, air and noise pollution, dangerously 
unlit and uninhabited overpasses, socially divided neighborhoods, and 
a lack of green space. 
 The distinct opportunity presented by the development of air 
rights has already resulted in rarely seen cooperation between city and 
state officials. Hopefully, it will also provide occasion to rid Boston of 
restrictive and outmoded land use laws created through misunder-
standing and bias. These quirks of history have hindered Boston’s fu-
ture for far too long. It is time to update Massachusetts planning legis-
lation and allow Boston to determine its own future with zoning ordi-
nances that apply to all land owners, no matter what their identity. Only 
then will Boston be able to develop air rights—and the city as a whole— 
in an efficient and responsible manner. 
